Kerry And Democracy

David Adesnik displays some interests in learning my thoughts on John Kerry and the question of democracy-promotion. Let it be done:

I've written both short and long versions of my critique of democracy-promotion à la Bush, so I won't rehash that here. Let me just reiterate that there's something fundamentally paradoxical about the neoconservative belief-nexus holding that we (a) must spread democracy everywhere, (b) need pay no attention to global public opinion, (c) must perpetually extent American hegemony, and (d) must unfetter the United States from the shackles of international law. This mish-mash of ideas finds itself in constant conflict and ultimately doesn't make any sense.

But the question was about John Kerry.

It's often said that Kerry lacks commitment to the idea of spreading democracy abroad. This is wrong. What he lacks is Ye Olde Messianic Verve on the subject, which to some people is the same thing. What he has is the rather dry consensus belief among Democratic Party national security folks that there are a number of steps we should be taking that will help build civil society in the "greater middle east" while equipping the United States with an array of carrots and sticks that can be used to influence Middle Eastern regimes to liberalize their policies.

I haven't written about this specifically, but Spencer Ackerman has in his Kerry and the war on terrorism piece. What I have written about is Rep. Jim Turner's ideas on the subject, ideas that were developed in consultation with more-or-less the same group of people who are working with Kerry. As the Turner piece says, I think these are good ideas. The problem, as I wrote at the conclusion of that piece, is that I don't think it's actually going to happen:

The reality is that there's no constituency for spending directed against terrorism. Tax cuts or expanded health coverage bring direct and obvious benefits to at least some segments of the electorate, and it's extremely hard to claim credit for the attacks your spending may or may not have prevented. Foreign aid, especially, is a tough sell: Why build schools in Beirut when the people of Brooklyn still have unmet needs? Given sufficient leadership, such things are possible (the Marshall Plan did, after all, pass at a time when the United States was not without problems of its own), but there's little sign that any major figure on the scene cares to exercise it.

Turner says "we need to regain that sense of urgency that we had after 9-11 "if we want to get the war on terrorism back on track. We had that sense of urgency once, and the president fumbled the ball. The opposition, meanwhile, didn't gain its nerve until the urgency had dissipated." Under the circumstances, perhaps the best we can hope for are leaders who won't do the same when that sense is renewed by another domestic attack.

I think that's probably right. Kerry and his team will have the right goals with regard to democracy-promotion, and understand the right tools to get the job done. What I seriously doubt they'll have is the wherewithal to pry to resources necessary out of the teeth of what's likely to be a Republican-dominated congress. In part, this failure will reflect a lack of commitment on Kerry's part and in part it will reflect GOP obstinacy. The resulting situation will be not unlike the state of play with regard to gay rights in a Kerry administration -- around the margins and as opportunities present themselves, he will work to improve the situation in whatever ways seem possible, but he's unlikely to stretch the boundaries of the possible. As on gay rights, the real responsibility here lies with those of us working in society rather than in the state to create the context in which political leaders will do the right thing. Insofar as Americans want gays and lesbians to enjoy equal rights (which they increasingly do), gays and lesbians tend to get them. Insofar as they don't, they don't. The true convictions of officeholders aren't the key variable. Insofar as Americans want to devote large quantities of resources to realistic programs to liberalize the world, it will get done, but I don't see the political pressure suddently materializing.

Perhaps I'll be pleasantly surprised by Kerry. His work on BCCI and normalization of relations with Vietnam shows that Kerry, quite admirably, has a taste for putting in hard work on seemingly thankless causes. My strong, strong suspicion, however, is that his appetite for such work will be exhausted by coping with the deficit and Iraq and that there's not going to be a huge deal of dogged-work-energy left to be deployed on democratization.

So that's not a very hearty endorsement of Kerry on democracy grounds. But it's better than what Bush is offering, which actually makes things worse. What's more, Kerry has people associated with him who actually know a thing or two about the business of democratic transitions, civil society building, postconflict reconstruction, and other relevant matters. Bush has people associated with him who know a lot about moral clarity, game theory, and precision munitions. Thus, while I think there probably isn't a great deal of difference between what, in practice, either man will achieve in the years 2005-2008, Kerry's likely to do some good and there's at least a possibility that he'll do a great deal. Bush will give us four more years of more of the same.