Really

The Daily Times of Pakistan reports:

The Musharraf regime is “unlikely to evolve into a long-term ally in the war on terrorism,” though the United States should seek to “prevent Pakistan from descending into chaos in the short term,” according to the Cato Institute, a leading liberal think tank.

Given the, um, interesting description of Cato there and the fact that I hadn't seem them argue any such thing, I was skeptical. The magic of Google, however, reveals all (PDF) and I think it's pretty persuasive:

Policymakers should consider an alternate interpretation of Pakistan’s behavior. Since 9/11, Musharraf has been opportunistic. He responded to political and military pressure from the United States by ending his country’s alliance with the Taliban and other radical Islamic groups, taking steps to liberalize his country’s political and economic system, and opening the road to an accord with India over Kashmir. But there are no signs that Musharraf and his political and military allies have made a strategic choice to ally themselves with U.S. long-term goals in the war on terrorism by destroying the political and military infrastructure of the radical and violent anti-American Islamic groups in Pakistan. It is highly probable that Musharraf is not strong enough to do so. From that perspective, the partnership with the United States and Musharraf’s willingness to negotiate with India over Kashmir are nothing more than short-term moves aimed at winning U.S. assistance and preventing India from emerging as Washington’s main ally in the region.

If this alternate interpretation is correct, the current American relationship with Pakistan is, at best, a short-term alliance of necessity. Over the medium and long term, U.S. policymakers should distance themselves from Musharraf’s regime, seek out ways to cultivate liberal secular reforms in Pakistan, and engage in more constructive relations with India.

Such a policy shift would reflect present-day reality: Westernized and secular India is a stable democracy and a rising regional power, not a de facto client of the Soviet Union, as it was widely presumed to be during the Cold War. With the Cold War order long since dismantled, the United States has a clear interest in establishing strong ties with India, whose political, economic, and military clout places the country in a position to counterbalance even an increasingly assertive China. As the world’s largest democracy and an important bilateral trading partner with the United States, India, not Pakistan, should be the focus of long-term U.S. policy in the region.

I'm not sure that "cultivat[ing] liberal secular reforms in Pakistan" has much promise, but I think this is generally right. I wonder if anyone else remembers having watched General Musharraf's address sometime in the week after 9/11 explaining that he was going to side with the USA. It was obvious from the look on his face and the tone of his voice that this was a man who was scared shitless. Pakistan had been playing a dangerous game for years, and it had just blown up in the faces of several thousand people in Lower Manhattan. If he didn't get his shit together, there was going to be hell to pay. The result was a very useful tactical alliance for the United States. But that moment is passed, and it's time to put US policy in South Asia back in line with the fundamental realities. We may not see eye to eye on the Social Security calculator, but I love Cato's foreign and defense policy stuff. I'm with them on this, too. And outsourcing. Remember outsourcing? Ah, those were the days. . . .