First Things First

A little while back I had a -- to me -- frustrating exchange with Greg Djerejian about drawing down troop levels in Iraq. Greg, or so it seemed to me, wasn't really engaging with what I was saying, instead preferring to argue that I somehow didn't really mean what I said I meant and to talk smack about Bill Clinton's foreign policy [UPDATE: somewhat naturally, he disputes this characterization -- see his earlier posts and read for yourself; for context, my initial post on the subject was more directed at people to my left, so it's kind of different in tone from a post like this which is aimed at the other side]. His latest effort helps me achieve some clarity as to what we're disagreeing about. But to be clear from the get-go, one thing we're not disagreeing about is the merits of the Clinton Bosnia policy, especially during the first term. The relevance of this point escapes me, but Greg keeps bringing it up. What I'm trying to talk about is what we should do now in Iraq. Greg writes:

Approximately 138,000 troops in theater through the New Year at least looks to be a certitude. Thereafter, and only if conditions allow (ie, Sunni participation in nascent political governance structures moving in right direction; insurgency continuing to weaken) only then would there perhaps be major draw-downs in '06. Compare this to Matt Y and the Prospect-y crowd that advocates drawing down, say, 20,000-40,000 (my best guess of what Matt has in mind; though he doesn't deign to clue us lumpenproleteriat in to the 'right' quantum) of the forces in theater with some immediacy.

Ah okay. I don't have a really specific view about the appropriate short-term troop level. What I would say is this. It's vital to establish a commitment to long-term withdrawal, which would have the following elements: No permanent bases, a target date for zeroing out the American deployment, and a set of feasible benchmarks for interim withdrawals. This commitment should be combined with a non-trivial short-term withdrawal as a token of good faith and bona fide commitment to the plan.

Now to be clear, I don't want to see a precipitous, panicky, running away here. That means, to me, that you need to go about setting the long-term date the right way. I would suggest something like this. Condoleezza Rice and her staff make a guess about when a zero troop level situation will be viable. Call that Date X. Then add some months onto Date X and call that the Optimistic Target. Then add some more months to the Optimistic Target and call that the Final Target. There are Iraqis who are nervous about our intentions on both sides. Some worry that we'll never leave and Iraq will become some kind of West Bank writ large. Others worry that we'll abandon our Iraqi allies too soon, they'll be overrun, and meet the fate of the South Lebanon Army or some such thing. You need a date designed to alleviate both of those fears. One far enough in the past as to give confidence that it isn't merely an effort to weasel away, but one firm enough as to give confidence that the need to battle the insurgency isn't merely an excuse for indefinite occupation. One can add that even after the Target is reached, the Iraqi government will continue to have (if it wants) serious financial and diplomatic support from the United States as well as support from the U.S. intelligence community and low-footprit assets that can be kept in the air, in the sea, or in outer space and that will give Iraq's security forces a clear qualitative edge over whomever they may be fighting. A short-term withdrawal is important largely for somewhat symbolic purposes -- to make it clear that as Iraqi troops are trained, American troops will be sent home, and that the whole process is on the up-and-up.

The problem with the Djerejian/Bush strategy is encompassed by the statement "if conditions allow (ie, Sunni participation in nascent political governance structures moving in right direction; insurgency continuing to weaken) only then would there perhaps be major draw-downs in '06." What's wrong with this? Well, what's wrong with it is that if you make Sunni participation in nascent governance structures (which is necessary for the insurgency to really weaken) a condition for moving toward withdrawal, you're not going to get Sunni participation in nascent governance structures, and therefore you're never going to withdraw. Right now we're trapped in a vicious circle. Sunni participation is a condition for withdrawal, but withdrawal is a condition for Sunni participation. Somebody needs to make the first move here and get us out of the trap. In an interview yesterday with The New York Times, Sheik Harith al-Dari "made clear that he would continue to view the armed resistance as legitimate until the American military offered a clear timetable for its withdrawal - a condition very unlikely to be met." This view is rather typical of moderate Sunni Arab views in Iraq. There are, to be sure, extremists (espcially foreigners) in the country who just want to wage war against Americans and Shiites. And there are also nice cuddly moderates like Pachachi. But the al-Dari types are the key constituency. They will support a battle against an American occupation, but not a battle against a new, independent, Iraqi order. If there the insurgency is to be beaten, we need Sunni participation. If we want Sunni participation, we need al-Dari and his ilk. And if we want them, we need a plan for withdrawal as part of an intercommunal compromise.